Some studies have shown that managers concentrate large fractions of their wealth in the equity of their own firm. In this paper we use a unique dataset and investigate how Swedish owner-managers invest remaining wealth conditional on a major investment in their own firm. We find no evidence that owner-managers seek diversification benefits when they invest remaining wealth. Instead some owner-managers invest remaining wealth in the industry where they already have a substantial capital investment. We conclude that some owner-managers seek to exploit their industry-specific superior information when they invest wealth not tied up in their own firms
Introduction
A central tenet of financial theory is that individuals seek portfolio diversification. However, agency costs and adverse selection costs suggest that managers should hold a large stake in the firm to avoid incentive alignment problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; Leland and Pyle, 1977) . If managers hold a large stake in the firm they incur costs stemming from increased risk in the form of poor portfolio diversification (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Models of managers' behaviour and executive compensation frequently account for managers' exposure to idiosyncratic firm risk. 1 Contrary to these models, Ofek and Yermack (2000) empirically show that managers hedge their executive stock options by selling shares. However, we are not aware of any evidence on whether and how managers hedge their equity ownership in the firm by strategically choosing investments outside the firm. This highlights the contribution of our study. Using information about owner-managers' equity portfolios we examine how they invest wealth not invested in the firm.
How shall owner-managers invest their wealth that is not invested in the firm? On the one hand, the benefits of portfolio diversification suggest that they should choose other stocks with negative or low correlation with their own firm. Taking the investment in the firm as a constraint the optimal 1 see e.g. Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 2000. strategy for remaining wealth is probably not a combination of the risk -free asset and the market portfolio (Merton, 1971) .
On the other hand, Moskovitz (1999 and and Hau (2001) suggest that investors may limit their investments to stocks on which they have superior information. It could be argued that ownermanagers have superior information about firms that are in similar lines of business as their own firm. Since the returns from firms in similar lines of business most likely are highly correlated, this would be the contrary to portfolio diversification.
In this paper, we attempt to answer two questions: First, do owner-managers choose other equity investments i) with negative or low correlation with their firms, ii) with negative or low correlation among themselves, and iii) that are superior to just investing remaining wealth in the market portfolio? We define the value of other equity investments as remaining wealth. Second, do ownermanagers that are active in industries characterized by high degree asymmetric information to a larger extent invest their remaining wealth in the same industry (Merton, 1987) ? We define informational technology and telecom as industries with high degree of asymmetric information.
We investigate these issues using a unique dataset which includes the complete ownership structure of all Swedish public firms. Our sample consists of the equity holdings of 109 managers in listed Swedish firms as of December 28, 2001 . 2 For these equity portfolios we estimate several riskcharacteristics. We find limited evidence that owner-managers strategically choose stocks with low correlation. Instead, the average owner-manager would significantly reduce his exposure to idiosyncratic risk would he invest remaining wealth in the market portfolio. This result is driven by owner-managers in high-tech industries who choose to invest also remaining wealth in information technology and telecom. However, the owner managers would be better off still would they invest remaining wealth in a portfolio that would hedge their main investment. Finally, by comparing Sharpe ratios we provide a casual estimate of the cost the owner-managers bear in terms of under diversification. On average, the owner-managers could have improved their Sharpe ratios by 45 percent would they have sold their main investment and invested in a well diversified portfolios (see Meulbroek, 2001 ).
Researchers have looked at how much wealth managers and entrepreneurs invest in their own firm. Himmelberg et al (1999) find that the higher is the firm's risk, the lower is managerial ownership. They interpret this as increased firm risk raises the cost of managerial ownership in terms of reduced portfolio diversification and therefore managerial ownership is reduced. Heaton and Lucas (2000) report that entrepreneurs receive a large fraction of their income from risky business ventures and that this risk is undiversifiable. Bitler et al (2004) find that entrepreneurs concentrate large fraction of their wealth in firm equity and that entrepreneurial ownership increases with outside wealth and decreases with firm risk. None of these studies look at how managers invest remaining wealth.
Other researchers have investigated investor behaviour in general. Contrary to standard theory, investors hold undiversified portfolios made up of a limited number of stocks (Barber and Odean, 2000; Goetzman and Kumar, 2002) . Stocks also appear to be chosen based on geographical or professional nearness to the investor (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Goetzmann et al, 2003) .
By focusing on owner-managers' portfolio choice we add to the literature on investment and portfolio choice. Goetzman et al (2003) investigate how non-financial risks in the form of undiversifiable human capital affect portfolio choice. The owner-managers in our study also have a large capital investment in the firm. 3 How investors choose to invest remaining wealth conditional on a large investment in a particular firm has to our knowledge not been studied before. Additionally, owner-managers should have better knowledge of standard portfolio theory than the average investor. Finally, by comparing owner-managers active within 3 We do not analyze why they hold a large block in the firm. information technology where informational advantages, real or perceived, should be stronger than within traditional industry, we shed additional light on to what extent superior information affects portfolio choice.
We also indirectly add to the literature on executive compensation. Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that managers hedge their stock options by selling shares. If managers also hedge their equity by taking offsetting position in the stock-market, it would further negate the incentive effects of equity based compensation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present our sample and how we define various portfolio characteristics. Section 3 reports our results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
Sample selection and variable definitions
In this section we first explain how our sample is constructed and provide descriptive statistics. We then discuss how various risk-characteristics of the owner-managers' equity portfolios are estimated. Finally, we provide statistics on the industry composition of the owner-managers' portfolios.
Sample selection
The sample consists of the equity portfolios held by owner-managers (CEO or chairman) active in firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) as of December 28, 2001. The source of ownership data is a unique database provided by the Swedish Securities Register Centre (VPC AB). 4 VPC AB manages the share registers of all companies on the SSE or other authorised Swedish market places as well as the share registers of many non-listed Swedish companies. Admittedly, neither do we know how much wealth the owner-managers have besides direct investments on the Swedish stock-market, nor how this wealth is invested. However, we argue that if the owner-managers try to reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk it would affect their portfolio of direct investments in Swedish equity. Choosing equity investments strategically would also be a cheap way of reducing their exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
Our sample only includes top managers (CEOs or Chairmen) that are among the 25 largest shareholders in their firm. The reason for this is that we identify the managers with data provided by SIS Ownership Service Corp (SIS Ägarservice AB) which provides statistics of share ownership of the largest 25 investors for all firms listed on a Swedish stock-market in the book; "Owners and Power in Sweden's Listed Companies" (Sundin and Sundqvist, 2002) . 5 In total we find 192 top managers that are among the 25 largest shareholders in their firm. Because some of the owner-managers own stocks indirectly through another company we are not always able capture all their investments in Swedish stocks and therefore we exclude 47 managers from the sample. In addition eight managers are excluded from the sample because they are active as chairman in several companies or active as both CEO and chairman in different companies. Another 28 managers are excluded because they own stocks through a foreign deposit or are active in firms with poor equity return data. 6 The final sample consists of equity portfolios held by 109 ownermanagers (63 CEOs and 46 chairmen) active in 93 out of the 304 firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in December 2001. There are 370 different firms in the equity portfolios held by the ownermanagers in our sample and 288 of those firms are listed on a stock exchange in Sweden. Security prices of the listed firms are provided by SIX AB. If a firm has stocks with different voting rights and only one type of the stock is traded we proxy the stock return of the non-traded stock with the return of the traded stock. 7 If a firm has several listed stocks we use returns data for the most traded stock.
In table 1 panel A we report the age of the owner-managers, statistics about the ownermanagers' investments in their own firms, and risk characteristics of these firms. The average age of the owner-managers is 51 years with a median of 52 years. CEOs are relatively younger with an average age of 49 years compared to the chairmen in the sample which have an average age of 57 years (not reported in table). There are only two equity portfolios held by females in our sample so essentially all the owner-managers in the sample are males (98 percent).
The average owner-manager in our sample has 78.8 percent of his direct investment in Swedish stocks invested his own firm. On average (median) the owner-managers hold 11 percent (5.3 percent) of the cash flow rights and 17.6 percent (8 percent) of the voting rights in their own firms. The average market capitalization of the owner-managers' firms is smaller than the average firm on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2806 million SEK vs. 9363 million SEK). The average systematic risk measured as beta of the companies the owner-managers' firms are close to unity, with an average beta of 1.08 and a 5 Swedish companies domiciled abroad are not included. 6 Owner-managers active in companies with shares traded less than three months during 2001 are also removed from the sample. 7 Swedish firms often issue two types of shares (A and B) with equal cash flow rights but different voting rights. Typically, A shares are one-share-one-vote while B-shares carry 1/10 vote per share. median beta of 0.949. 8 The average (median) total risk of these firms measured as annualized standard deviation is 67. Table 1 Panel B presents the number of firms in the owner-managers equity portfolios and the risk characteristics of those portfolios. The average (median) number of firms in the owner-managers' equity portfolios is 11 (6) . When calculating the value and risk characteristics of the owner-managers portfolios, non-listed firms are not considered since market values and historical returns data are lacking for these firms. 9 Risk characteristics of the equity portfolios held by the owner-managers are calculated using weekly equity return data during 2001. Because some stocks were only traded a short period in 2001 and some stocks were very illiquid, the risk characteristics are only estimated for 255 out of the 288 listed firms held by the owner-managers. The average beta of the owner-managers portfolios is 1.062 (median 0.946), and the average total risk measured by annualized standard deviation is 57.9 percent (median 52.5 percent). The fraction of idiosyncratic risk in relation to total risk measured as variance is on average 73.4 percent (median 63.3 percent). The high degree of idiosyncratic risk in the portfolios indicates that much of the total risk in the portfolios could be reduced with a higher degree of diversification. [See appendices, table 21] . Table 2 panel A provides statistics on the most widely held stocks among the owner-managers in our sample. It appears as if Swedish owner-managers roughly invest in the same stocks as the general investor. The most common Swedish stocks among all shareholders (Rank number of shareholders) are also the most common stocks among the ownermanagers in our sample. One exception is Föreningssparbanken which is the third most common stock ranked on number of shareholders (tenth largest stock according to market capitalization) in general but not one of the 18 most popular stocks among our sample of ownermanagers. Another bank, Nordea, was the third largest Swedish stock ranked on market capitalization but not one of the 18 most popular stocks in our sample.
Panel B reports the industry sectors in which the owner-managers' firms are active. Almost half of the sample is active in Information Technology (47 percent) and Telecom (2 percent Table 3 presents industry composition and statistics on the degree of industry concentration in the ownermanagers' equity portfolios. All the listed firms held by the owner-managers are categorized as belonging to one of ten industry sectors according to the Global Industry Classification System (GICS) provided by Morgan Stanley Capital International and Standard & Poor's.
Industry Concentration of Portfolios
We use the Herfindahl Index (HI) as a measure of the industry concentration in the owner-managers' equity portfolios. 10 The Herfindahl Index of equity portfolio j is defined as the sum of the squared value weights of each industry i in the equity portfolio:
The Herfindahl Index is constrained between a maximum of one, i.e. the equity portfolio only consists of stocks in one industry sector and a minimum of 1/10, when the equity portfolio consists of an equal value in each of the ten industry sectors.
The median equity portfolio among the ownermanagers has a very high proportion of investments in few industry sectors since the Herfindahl Index is close to one (0.948). Even if we exclude the ownermanagers' investments in their own firms the Herfindahl Index for the median equity portfolio is high (0.529).
Empirical Results
In this section we first report results on how ownermanagers choose to invest remaining wealth given a large investment in their own firm. We then investigate whether the owner-managers would have been better of had they invested remaining wealth in the market portfolio. Finally, we explore whether owner-managers in high-tech industries try to use their superior industry specific knowledge by investing also remaining wealth in the informationtechnology and telecom sectors.
Correlation between the firm and other investments
In table 4 panel A we report the correlation between the owner-manager's firm and the other stocks in his portfolio. We compare this correlation to the firm's correlation with a randomly chosen Swedish stock, 10 The Herfindahl Index is a popular measure of concentration in economics and is also used by the Department of Justice in the U.S. to determine whether mergers are equitable to society.
i.e. the average correlation between the firm and other Swedish stocks. We report results for equally and value weighted portfolios.
The results for the equally weighted portfolios suggest that managers choose to invest remaining wealth in stocks with significantly higher correlation with their own firm than a randomly chosen Swedish stock. This is inconsistent with owner-managers seeking to minimize their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. However, if we account for the different stocks' weight in the portfolios, owner-managers chose stocks with similar correlation with their own firms as the average Swedish stock. Hence, it appears as if the average owner-manager chooses other stocks without taking the correlation with the firm in which he has a substantial block into account. This is still inconsistent with owner-managers seeking to minimize their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. In fact, for all owner-managers in our sample there are other Swedish stocks with negative correlation with the firm in which they have their main investment. [See appendices, table 4].
3.2.Correlation among other investments
It is not only the correlation with owner-manager's firm that affects the idiosyncratic risk of the ownermanager's portfolio. The correlation among the other stocks chosen by the owner-manager is also of interest. In table 4 panel B we report the correlation between the other stocks in the owner-managers' portfolios. The average correlation between the other stocks in the owner-managers' portfolios is 0.291. If the owner-manager's firm is included, the average correlation is 0.283. These correlations are compared to the average correlation between Swedish stocks. Would the owner-manager pick two other stock at random they would have a significantly lower correlation coefficient at 0.227. Thus, it appears as if the owner-managers choose other stocks with significantly higher correlation between themselves than the average stocks. We return to this issue in section 3.4.
Unique (Idiosyncratic) Risk
In panel A we show that owner-managers do not choose other stocks with lower correlation with their own firms than the average Swedish stock. In panel B we show that the other stocks in the ownermanagers' portfolio show higher correlation between themselves than the average Swedish stocks. In panel C we investigate how this affects their portfolio risk. We compare the owner-manager's actual Portfolio to an Alternative where remaining wealth, i.e. wealth invested on the Swedish stock market but not in his own firms, is invested in the market portfolio.
Taking the investment in the firm as a constraint the optimal strategy for remaining wealth is probably not a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio (Merton, 1971 ). Thus, the Alternative portfolio is not the optimal portfolio. It is a simple alternative that would not require solving for the constrained optimum portfolio weights.
Both the actual Portfolio and the Alternative portfolio have beta-values close to unity. However, the return variance is significantly higher for the actual Portfolio compared to the Alternative portfolio. And this difference stems from higher idiosyncratic risk. The market risk does not differ between the portfolios. Thus, the owner-managers would significantly reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk would they invest remaining wealth in the market portfolio instead of the stocks they have chosen.
Owner-managers in high-tech industries
Our results so far suggest that owner-managers do not seek portfolio diversification when they invest remaining wealth. An alternative hypothesis is that they seek to exploit their industry specific superior knowledge and invest also remaining wealth in the same sector as their own firm, i.e. stocks with high correlation between themselves and with the ownermanagers' own firms. This would be contrary to portfolio diversification and roughly consistent with our results so far. We conjecture that superior knowledge is most valuable in high-tech industries. The information technology and telecom sectors are defined as high-tech industries and we split the sample according to whether the owner-manager's firm is active in a high-tech industry or not. A firm is defined as being active a high-tech industry if it report information technology or telecom as its main sector. 53 owner-managers in our sample (49 percent) are active in high-tech industries.
In table 5 panel A we report various portfolio characteristics for owner-managers in high-tech industries and traditional industries, respectively. The value of the owner-managers' investment in the firm, its fraction of the total portfolio of Swedish equity, and the number of firms in the portfolio do not differ between the two subsamples. 11 However, the risk characteristics, i.e. beta, variance, market risk, and idiosyncratic risk, are all significantly higher for owner-managers in the high-tech industry. This is of course due to the turbulence in the information technology and telecom sectors in 2001. However, the average owner-manager in high-tech industries loose more diversification benefits (Lost Diversification) from not investing remaining wealth in the market portfolio than the average ownermanager in traditional industries. This result is not 11 The skewed distribution (average 1241 and median 17) of the Value of manager's investment in Traditional industries is due to one observation. Therefore, the t-test does not suggest a significance difference between High Tech Industries and Traditional Industries. necessarily due to the turbulence in the information technology and telecom sectors. Lost Diversification is defined as the difference between the actual Portfolio's idiosyncratic risk and the Alternative portfolio's idiosyncratic risk.
In panel B, C, and D we investigate whether the owner-managers in high-tech industries choose other stock in their portfolios differently from ownermanagers in traditional industries. We first concentrate on the correlation with the ownermanager's own firm in panel B. On average, ownermanagers in high-tech sectors chose other stocks that have correlation coefficients with the ownermanagers' firm above 30 percent. Owner-managers in traditional industries chose stocks with significantly lower correlation with their main investment. On average, the correlation coefficients for the stocks chosen by owner-managers in traditional industries are 0.216 and 0.228 for the equally and value weighted portfolio, respectively.
In panel C we look at the correlation between the chosen stocks. Again, owner-managers in hightech industries chose stocks that among themselves show correlation coefficients above 0.3. And ownermanagers in traditional industries chose stocks that among themselves show significantly lower correlations. The same pattern is evident also when the owner-managers main investment is included in the correlation matrix.
Panel B and C suggest that owner-managers in high-tech industries invest in other stock that are highly correlated among themselves and highly correlated with the owner-managers main investment. Thus, it appears as if owner-managers in high-tech industries try to exploit their industry specific superior information (real or perceived). However, so far we have only looked at correlations and not explored in what firms and industries the owner-managers actually invest. We turn to this issue in panel D.
We first look at how much of the portfolio that is invested in the main industry, i.e. the industry in which the owner-manager's firm is active. With respect to this measure, the portfolios of ownermanagers in high-tech industries show no significant differences compared to the portfolios of ownermanagers in traditional industries. As an alternative measure we estimate the Herfindahl index based on the portfolio's industry composition. The Herfindahl index suggests no significant differences.
However, the results based on the remaining wealth suggest significant differences. Ownermanagers in high-tech industries invest significantly more of their remaining wealth in the same sector as their main investment. The average owner-manager invests more than 40 percent of remaining wealth in the same sector as his main investment. The average owner-manager in traditional industries invests about 20 percent of remaining wealth in the same sector as his main investment. Would the owner-manager seek diversification, this should probably be zero. Estimating the Herfindahl index only for remaining wealth suggests a similar pattern. Owner-managers in high-tech industries concentrate the remaining wealth to the main sector to a larger extent. The difference is significant at the 10 percent level.
During
Cross-Sectional Regressions
So far we have not controlled for factors that may affect the owner-managers' portfolios choice. Younger individuals may be more willing to hold more risky portfolios. Likewise, wealthier individuals may be more willing to hold more risky portfolios. And CEOs may to a larger extent hold restricted stocks which they are not allowed to sell. CEOs may also have more industry specific superior knowledge than chairmen. Is it these types of spurious correlations that drive the results reported above?
Indeed we find that younger individuals and CEOs hold more risky portfolios (unreported). However, the CEO result appears to be explained by age, i.e. CEOs are on average significantly younger than Chairmen. And the age result appears to stem from age being positively correlated with wealth. In sum, older individuals are wealthier and they are more likely to be chairmen than CEOs.
In table 6 we report cross-sectional regression with various portfolio characteristics as explanatory variables. An indicator variable, IT-Dummy, is used as an approximation of the amount of industry specific superior knowledge that the owner-manager possesses. IT-Dummy is equal to one if the ownermanager's firm is active in information technology or telecom. We control for the owner-manager's age, whether he/ she is CEO, and the total wealth they have invested on the Swedish stock market.
In M1, Lost Diversification is the dependent variable. Lost Diversification is defined as the difference between the actual portfolio's idiosyncratic risk and the Alternative portfolio's idiosyncratic risk. The IT-DUMMY variable is positively significant indicating that owner-managers in high-tech industries give up more diversification by not investing in the market portfolio, compared to owner-managers in traditional industries. The control variables are insignificant. In M2-M5 we investigate what aspects of the portfolio choice of ownermanagers in high-tech industries that could explain why they forfeit more diversification benefits than other owner-managers. Is it that they invest i) in other stock that is highly correlated with their firms, ii) in other stock that are highly correlated among themselves, iii) the industry composition of the total portfolio and/ or the industry composition of remaining wealth? In M2, Correlation(firm, other portfolio stock) is the dependent variable. It is defined as the value weighted average correlation between the ownermanager's firm and the other stocks in his/her portfolio of Swedish equity. Again the IT-DUMMY is positively significant indicating that especially owner-managers in high-tech industries chose to invest remaining wealth in stock that is highly correlated with the firm in which they have a major investment. AGE and CEO DUMMY are also positively significant at the one percent and ten percent level, respectively.
In M3, Correlation among other portfolio stock is the dependent variable. It is defined as the average correlation between other stocks in the ownermanager's portfolio. The IT-DUMMY is positively significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, not only do owner-managers in high-tech industries choose other stocks that are highly correlated with their major investment, they also choose stocks that are highly correlated among themselves. The control variables are all insignificant in M3.
In M4 Main's fraction of total portfolio is dependent variable. It is defined as the proportion of total wealth invested on the Swedish stock market that is invested in the same industry as the ownermanager's major investment. The IT-DUMMY is here negatively significant indicating that ownermanagers in high-tech industries in fact have a smaller proportion of their portfolio of Swedish equity in the same industry as their major investment. This stems from the fact that ownermanagers in high-tech industries have invested less of their wealth in their own firms compared to owner-managers in traditional industries. It is not a result of owner-managers investing remaining wealth outside the industry in which they have their major investment. This is evident from M5.
In M5 Main sector of remaining portfolio is dependent variable. It is defined as the proportion of the owner manager's remaining wealth that is invested in the same sector as the owner-manager's firm reports as its main sector. The IT-Dummy positive and highly significant. This is stronger evidence consistent with the argument that ownermanagers in high-tech try to exploit their industry specific superior knowledge when choosing how to invest remaining wealth.
Optimal Portfolios
Merton (1971) points out that given investment constraints the optimal portfolio is not a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. Thus, given the large investment in the main firm remaining wealth could probably be invested better than in the market portfolio. In this section we investigate this issue.
We first solve for the owner-manager's optimal portfolio given the large investment in the own firm. This portfolio is labelled the Hedge portfolio. This is done by taking the volatility of the actual portfolio as given and maximizing expected return. Thus, we conjecture that the volatility of the actual portfolio captures the owner-managers risk-aversion and find the maximum expected return given the chosen risk. The owner-manager can choose to invest in ten different industry indices. 12 The expected return is defined according to CAPM where the risk-free rate is set to 2 percent and the market risk-premium to 5 percent. 13 Second, we solve for the Optimal portfolio setting the main investment to zero. The expected return is maximized given the same volatility as the actual portfolio. Finally, we compare the Sharpe ratios for the different portfolios.
In Table 7 panel A we report the expected return, yearly volatility, and the Sharpe ratio for the actual portfolio, the Alternative portfolio (remaining wealth in the market portfolio), the Hedge portfolio, and the Optimal portfolio. The mean volatility is not the same for the actual portfolio, the Hedge portfolio and the Optimal portfolio since it was not always possible to construct a portfolio with as high volatility as the actual portfolio with the ten sector indices. The medians are however, the same for these three portfolios. It differs for the Alternative portfolio since it is constructed without conditioning on volatility. We therefore focus on the Sharpe ratios. The mean and median Sharpe ratios increase linearly when we go from the actual portfolio to the Optimal portfolio. In panel B the difference tests show that i) the Alternative portfolio has a significant higher Sharpe ratio than the actual portfolio, ii) the Hedge portfolio is significantly better than the Alternative portfolio, and iii) the Optimal portfolio is superior to the Hedge portfolio. However, even though statistically significant, the economic importance of the difference between the actual 12 We choose to focus on the portfolios' industry composition in order to conform to the results reported above. Furthermore, using all the traded Swedish stocks in the optimization would be computationally extensive. 13 The choice of risk-free rate and market risk-premium does not qualitatively affect our results. portfolio and the Alternative portfolio and the Hedge portfolio, respectively, is moderate. The median Sharpe ratio of the actual portfolio is 0.095. The Sharpe ratio of the Hedge portfolio is 0.101. The small difference is a function of that, on average, remaining wealth is a small part of the ownermanagers' equity portfolios, just over 20 percent. Our results suggest that even if it possible to form statistically better portfolios using these 20 percent, the economic difference is small.
Finally, we note that the median owner-manager in our sample could have increased the Sharpe ratio of his equity portfolio by 45 percent (0.174 compared to 0.095) would he sell the large block. This is a casual estimate of the cost of under diversification. Heaney and Holmen (2004) uses direct estimates of Swedish owner-managers' total wealth and an approach based on utility functions. Given a constant relative risk aversion parameter of 2, they report a median cost associated with under diversification of 17 percent. The difference between our estimate of under diversification, 45 percent, and Heaney and Holmen's (2004) estimate might be a result of the different wealth estimates used. In this paper we only use wealth invested in Swedish equity. Heaney and Holmen use estimates of total wealth and report that the average owner-manager has roughly 50 percent of total wealth invested in the own firm.
Summary and Conclusion
Previous empirical work has found that investors tend to hold under diversified portfolios made up of a limited number of stocks on which the investors have superior information. Furthermore, there is evidence that managers concentrate large fractions of their wealth in the equity of their own firm. In this paper we use a unique dataset and investigate how Swedish owner-managers invest remaining wealth conditional on a major investment in their own firm. We find limited evidence that owner-managers choose to invest remaining wealth in stocks that show low correlation with the firm in which they have a substantial fraction of their wealth invested. Owner-managers also choose other stocks that show higher correlation among themselves than the average Swedish stocks. Our results appear to be driven by managers in high tech-industries who invest also remaining wealth in the information technology and telecom sectors. We conjecture that the value owner-managers attach to their industry specific knowledge should be highest in these sectors and conclude that instead of seeking diversification benefits, owner-managers seek to exploit their superior information when they choose in which stock to invest remaining wealth.
We also document that owner-managers would be better off would they invest remaining wealth in the market portfolio. However, the owner managers would be better off still would they invest remaining wealth in a portfolio that would hedge their main investment. Finally, by comparing Sharpe ratios we provide a casual estimate of the cost the ownermanagers bear in terms of under diversification. On average, the owner-managers could have improved their Sharpe ratios by 45 percent would they have sold their main investment and invested in a well diversified portfolios.
Swedish equity. Beta portfolio is the equity beta of the owner-manager's portfolio. Std Dev portfolio is the annualized standard deviation of the return in the owner-manager's portfolio. Variance firm is the annualized variance of the return in the owner-manager's portfolio. is the value weighted average correlation between the owner-manager's firm and the other stocks in his/ her portfolio of Swedish equity. Correlation other portfolio stocks (M3) is the average correlation between the stocks in the owner-manager's portfolio of Swedish equity. This is estimated without the owner-manager's firm. Main sector of total portfolio (M4) is the fraction of the total portfolio that is invested in the same sector as the owner-manager's firm report as its main sector. Main sector of remaining portfolio (M5) is the fraction of the remaining portfolio, i.e. wealth not invested in the firm, which is invested in the same sector as the owner-manager's firm report as its main sector. Coefficients are reported with heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parentheses (White, 1980). 20 owner-managers only own stocks in one firm. Therefore, in the models where the dependent variable requires at least 2 stocks, the sample is reduced to 89. Furthermore, 11 owner-managers only own stocks in 2 firms. Therefore, in M3, where the dependent variable requires 3 stocks, the sample is reduced to 78. IT-DUMMY is equal to one if the owner-manager's firm report informational technology or telecom as their main sector, and zero otherwise. AGE is defined as the owner-manager's age. CEO DUMMY is equal to one if the owner-manager is CEO in the firm, and zero otherwise. L WEALTH is defined as the natural logarithm of value of the owner-manager's portfolio of Swedish equity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In this table we provide statistics on characteristics of the owner-managers' actual portfolio, the alternative portfolio where remaining wealth is invested in the market portfolio, a hedge portfolio where remaining wealth is invested optimally in ten different sector indices based on the 10 sectors in the GICS, and the optimal portfolio (maximum expected return) with the same volatility as the actual portfolio. The hedge portfolio should conform to Merton's (1971) argument that given certain investment constraints, the optimal portfolio is not a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. The hedge portfolio is found by maximizing expected return given the main investment and the volatility of the actual portfolio. The optimal portfolio is found by maximizing expected return given the same volatility as the actual portfolio. When forming the hedge portfolio and the optimal portfolio 10 sector indices are used. The market portfolio is approximated by Affärsvärldens General Index (AFGX). Expected Return is defined as the risk-free rate plus the portfolio beta times the market risk-premium. The risk-free rate is set to 2 percent and the market risk-premium to 5 percent. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Market Risk portfolio is defined as
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Panel A: Characteristics of the owner-managers' actual portfolio, the alternative portfolio where remaining wealth is invested in the market portfolio, a hedge portfolio where remaining wealth is invested optimally in ten different sector indices, and the optimal portfolio with the same volatility as the actual portfolio. 
